The tragic assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan underlines the danger lurking in that crucial corner of South Asia. Our man in the GWOT*, General President Pervez Musharraf, is looking increasingly isolated and under fire, as her killing took place in the headquarters city of the Pakistani Army, Rawalpindi, adjacent to the capital Islamabad (which itself has been the scene of large-scale Islamist violence in recent months). We know that Pakistani government control is sketchy in the wild tribal zones of Waziristan (one of my favorite names for being evocative of the places they describe). How about the streets of the capital and its military headquarters?
Teresita Schafer, a former career diplomat and US Ambassador to Pakistan from 1992 to 1995, has a very sober assessment of Pakistan's prospects in today's Washington Post
It was unrealistic to expect a "soft landing" from Musharraf's hybrid government to a partial democracy mediated by Benazir. Musharraf never wanted to share power; indeed, he emphasized his belief in "unity of command." Especially after the six-week state of emergency this fall, Musharraf and the army had overwhelming incentive to ensure that the PPP [Bhutto's party] did not emerge from the January elections with a credible claim to the prime minister's job.
The article, attesting to Schaffer's experience in Pakistan stretching back to the 1970s, cannot make for happy reading in Bush Administration circles, especially when combined with another Washington Post article chronicling the year-long American diplomatic effort to persuade Ms. Bhutto to return to Pakistan:
The U.S. came to understand that Bhutto was not a threat to stability, but was instead the only possible way that we could guarantee stability and keep the presidency of Musharraf intact," said Mark Siegel, who lobbied for Bhutto in Washington and witnessed much of the behind-the-scenes diplomacy.
"The only possible way [to] guarantee stability and keep the Musharraf presidency intact..." The article quotes Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer and National Security Council staff member now at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy, on the plan to graft Bhutto to Musharraf
Many career foreign policy officials were skeptical of the U.S. plan. "There were many inside the administration, at the State and Defense Departments and in intelligence, who thought this was a bad idea from the beginning because the prospects that the two could work together to run the country effectively were nil," said Riedel.
We know from Iraq the extent to which career officials are listened to in Washington these days.
In case you missed it on Christmas Eve, here's a prescient NYT story that bears reading in light of yesterday's catapulting of Pakistan onto the screen. You'll be happy to know that we have
After Six Years, a Plan: Early last week, six years after President Bush first began pouring billions of dollars into Pakistan’s military after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the Pentagon completed a review that produced a classified plan to help the Pakistani military build an effective counterinsurgency force. The plan, which now goes to the United States Embassy in Islamabad to carry out, seeks to focus American military aid toward specific equipment and training for Pakistani forces operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas where Qaeda leaders and local militants hold sway.
Why is this significant? Because up to now, the article says, "Bush administration and military officials said they believed that much of the American money was not making its way to frontline Pakistani units. Money has been diverted to help finance weapons systems designed to counter India, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban." (my emphasis)
Yep. Old Pervez, who knows how to string along an Administration that starts salivating at the very mention of Al Qaeda (and little matter which dictatorship invokes "terrorism"), has been using US money to help him in Pakistan's six decade confrontation with democratic India (which is also supposed to be a US friend). If GWOT* has friends like this, who needs enemies? That said, Musharraf will probably always look preferable to the guys from Waziristan.
But if the US plan was to have Benazir Bhutto "save" Musharraf, where does it (and he) stand now?
*(GWOT = "Global War on Terror")