This week's Brussels-based "European Voice" has a front page article on French President Sarkozy's proposal to create an intervention force among the EU's six biggest members:
Sarkozy wants to boost European defence during his country’s presidency of the EU in the second half of this year and create what he describes as a “European pillar” within NATO. He is planning to use an offer to reintegrate France fully into NATO command in 2009 to leverage support from European allies for new initiatives on European defence.
The proposal would create a 60,000-strong force, with 10,000 soldiers coming from each of the big 6. A key part of the plan would be a pledge to spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on defense - something only France and the UK do at present.
Sarkozy comes up with lots of ideas - ask any French citizen, many of whom are asking, "when is going to follow through?" - but this one may have some chance of being pursued during France's EU Presidency, starting this July. The notion is not new: Europe has had its EUROCORPS - "A Force for Europe and NATO" - for years. But the size and source of contributing forces - all major members of both NATO and the EU - would be significant.
This proposal, if implemented, would come none too soon to help restore some confidence in the "European Pillar" of NATO. Recently, the widely respected military affairs analyst Andrew Bacevich wrote in the Los Angeles Times ("NATO At Twilight," February 11, 2008):
Once the Soviet threat disappeared, the European nations making up the core of the alliance wasted no time claiming their peace dividend. They cut defense budgets and shed military capacity. For example, the German army, which had 12 divisions in 1989, today maintains the equivalent of three. Even as armies shrunk, new missions proliferated.
One of the new missions was to expand. Today, NATO consists of 26 members, with Albania, Croatia and Macedonia lined up to join next. Still more candidates -- Serbia, Montenegro, even Georgia and Ukraine -- are knocking at the door. Adding members provided a mechanism for incorporating what had been Eastern Europe and even parts of the former Soviet Union into Europe proper. But enlargement diluted NATO's actual ability to defend itself. Rather than a collective security organization, the alliance became something more akin to a political club, far more adept at convening conferences than at organizing itself for war.
Bacevich also refers to US Defense Secretary Robert Gates' warning about the dangers of a "two-tier" alliance: "His warning comes too late. The two-tier arrangement already exists, with the great majority of member states content to occupy the lower tier." As for "political clubs," Europe, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and the United States all share membership in the Vienna-headquartered OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which, according to its website, is "the world's largest regional security organization whose 56 participating States span the geographical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok.") The OSCE should be the primary discussion forum - no need for NATO to duplicate the "talking shop."
Sarkozy's proposal - especially if embraced by Great Britian, France's partner in the ten-year old St. Malo Declaration - could mark the beginning of a reversal of the downward slide. After the long hiatus of post-Soviet drift, Russia under Putin has flexed its economic muscles, and Europe takes notice each time the gas pipeline nozzles are tightened. Within NATO, Europe can only assert its interests if backed up by credible military assets.