Watching the news these days from Chad, TV viewers might be excused for time-warp comparisons with evacuations from the past: Belgians from '60s Congo; westerners from '94 Rwanda; the list goes on. The theme here is Former European Colonial Power Saves Foreigners From Local Chaos. As in many past evacuations, that European Power is France. In Chad's capital N'Djamena (Fort Lamy in colonial times), those jaunty berets are a welcome sight for people who are allowed to leave.
That would include Americans. Here's today's Guardian:
The United States, which normally maintains a large embassy in N'Djamena, principally because of the involvement of ExxonMobil and Chevron in extracting oil in southern Chad, said France had "the expertise and the lead on this issue", and would have the support of the [UN] security council "should they decide to do more".
With most of its diplomatic staff joining hundreds of other expatriates on French military flights out of Chad, the US embassy is now abandoned.
I somehow doubt that "abandoned" is the right word, but skeleton staff is highly likely. That would include Chadian local staff, who can't just hop on a French Transall. Here's what the State Department tells would-be American travelers to Chad:
The ability of the U.S. Embassy to assist American citizens remaining in Chad is severely limited.
It's always a good idea for American diplomats in Africa to maintain cordial relations with their French counterparts. Sometimes their helicopters are closer than American ones. In remote Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, it made sense to maintain (unofficial) links with the French in Reunion, just over the horizon - a lot closer than the US forces in Diego Garcia, hours away at best. In Algeria, there was a nice tradition where the number two French and American diplomats, next door neighbors, shared keys to their garden gate. The tradition started mostly as a way of popping in for a drink, but was a reassurance during times of security threats too.
As with all examples of military presence, there is baggage, of course. In Chad, France has maintained a sizable force there since independence, and has similar garrisons in Ivory Coast, Djibouti, and elsewhere (somewhat outdated but useful LeMonde map). African leaders have mixed feelings about this lingering presence, despite their affection for French leaders who have engaged with Africa - "Chirac l'africain," Mitterand and his "Monsieur Afrique," etc. In those countries where it was the colonial power - notably Chad, most recently with the "Arche de Zoe" affair - anything France does is bound to find regional detractors. In the current Chadian crisis, the French stance has been active, while steering clear of political intervention. The Christian Science Monitor points out why:
France's major turnabout reflects both the hands-off philosophy of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and France's desire to lead a new European Union humanitarian peacekeeping force of troops of 3,700 men (2,100 of them French soldiers) to protect aid convoys to Darfur refugees living in Chad. The EUFOR mission would be the largest common defense mission in European Union history.
With increasing American (AFRICOM) military interest in Africa - concomitant with growing Chinese interest in Africa's resources - the US is wise to defer at times to the French on African matters. Though on a global scale the US military dwarfs all others (just look at the latest Defense budget), France is still willing and able to "project power" in Africa. In the latter days of the Clinton administration, I heard a Defense Department official tell a group of American ambassadors and military officers: "The French may be frustrating, but you don't want to engage without them." In the twilight of the Bush administration, militarily overextended throughout the world, but launching yet another military command for the one continent that had been "overlooked" by Pentagon planners, will the US learn any lessons from the behavior of a new French president eager to break with an interventionist past?