Civilian Control of the Military
As much as I might sympathize with soon-to-be-retired Admiral William "Fox" Fallon's view that "this constant drumbeat of conflict... is not helpful and not useful" (apropos of Administration war drums on Iran), it is not surprising that his record of brutally frank talk in the presence of journalists caused his departure from the top slot at Central Command. For the most concise summary of the likely "insubordination" verdict, here's an excerpt from "The Nelson Report" (subscription only), thanks to The Washington Note's Steve Clemons:
... Fallon was fired for hubris which amounted to insubordination, Congressional and other sources feel. It is both understandable and justifiable, given the chain of command and civilian control ethos of the US military. Any administration, and not just Bush and Gates, would rapidly conclude that they could not tolerate having their hand-picked commander for Iraq and Afghanistan seeming to take on responsibility for deciding whether to go to war with Iran (or any other country)...
What Chris Nelson is talking about is a basic democratic fact: elected civilians decide matters of war and peace, and uniformed military execute orders. Of course, you'd like it if the "elected civilians" include, in the American example, the Senate, as in "advice and consent."
It's worth reading the article in Esquire Magazine by Thomas P. M. Barnett, "The Man Between War and Peace," which was the proximate cause of Fallon's dismissal. You get a feel for a man who had nothing to prove: at close to four decades in the Navy, he could have retired long ago, especially after successfully heading one of the US Navy's prime posts, the four-star billet at Pearl Harbor, Pacific Command or PACOM, which covers a sizable chunk of the globe.
Masters of (Their) Universe
Apart from Fallon's well-publicized objections to the war talk coming from the White House, it is worth reading all of Barnett's piece to appreciate other ingredients in the Fallon story. Describing a quiet moment in Egypt, accompanying the Admiral on a annual CENTCOM exercise, Barnett recounts this exchange with Fallon:
I can tell that the cover story in this morning's Egyptian Gazette landed hard on somebody's desk at the White House. U.S. RULES OUT STRIKE AGAINST IRAN, read the banner headline, and the accompanying photo showed Fallon in deep consultation with Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak.
Fallon sidles up to me during a morning coffee break. "I'm in hot water again," he says.
"The White House?"
The admiral slowly nods his head.
"They say, 'Why are you even meeting with Mubarak?' " This seems to utterly mystify Fallon.
"Why?" he says, shrugging with palms extending outward. "Because it's my job to deal with this region, and it's all anyone wants to talk about right now. People here hear what I'm saying and understand. I don't want to get them too spun up. Washington interprets this as all aimed at them. Instead, it's aimed at governments and media in this region. I'm not talking about the White House." He points to the ground, getting exercised. "This is my center of gravity. This is my job."
It is not unheard of for four star American commanders of the "Combatant Commands" (CENTCOM, PACOM, AFRICOM, etc.) to meet with foreign heads of state and government in their respective "areas of responsibility" (AORs). This "military diplomacy" is an increasingly common facet of American engagement with the world. So if the White House was peeved at Fallon's meeting with Mubarak, it probably wasn't because he was playing diplomat. Rather, it may be a reflection of pique with the Egyptian leader, who may not be sufficiently "with the program" - the Bush program for the Middle East.
The President's Representative... Is Where?
We're not told, in the above instance, who else was huddling with Mubarak. The American Ambassador to Egypt - was he there? Elsewhere in the Barnett article, we learn about Fallon's meeting with the Pakistani President:
"I didn't do any preaching," Fallon says about his talks with Musharraf. "In a previous life here [reference to his PACOM days], I had two extra constitutional events: a coup in Thailand, and a head of the military took over in Fiji. So I talked to the president for quite a while yesterday, both with the ambassador and then alone.
"Both with the ambassador and then alone..." Now, US ambassadors are expected to be the President's personal representative in the countries to which they are assigned. One of the fears of ambassadors, in big countries or small, is that American generals will be popping into those same countries and hobnobbing with the government. Or giving orders to the Ambassador's staff, this time touring outlying provinces in Afghanistan:
... the governor piles on with a new complaint: Every winter, a local river becomes impassable for a local migratory tribe that is then stranded outside the valley.
Fallon asks the deputy chief of mission, "Are you aware of this?"
The DCM ["deputy ambassador"] replies, "No, I wasn't, and I promise to look into that."
None of this, individually, amounts to much, but taken as a whole, it underlines several sore points in the military-diplomatic relationship: who's in charge here?
Fallon appears to be brilliant, projects a can-do attitude, and has served his country honorably. His departure after speaking his mind shows the limits of "freedom of speech" in a chain of command that ends at the Oval Office. It is unfortunate, I think, that Admiral Fallon did not leave on his own time, and that if he truly feels that the War Party is in the ascendancy, he did not make an impassioned resignation statement and go his own way. This way, it leaves a feeling of irresolution, a hint of "insubordination" followed by an "acceptance" of retirement.
There is a way to clear away the lingering doubt. Hold a press conference. And join the growing club of generals critical of the Bush Administration's way in the world.